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In this thesis, I will discuss the new features of Confucian political thought in
early Western Han dynasty (B.C. 206-24 A.D.) as reflected in Xinyutf0(New
Speeches) by Lu Jia (fl. B.C. 216-176).
Confucius' political ideal, in a sense, can be epitomized in his slogan: "I
follow Zhou" (Confucius, 3:14; English translation from Chan, 1963, p. 113).
What he saw in the Zhou society was not merely the harmony in the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled but also its underlying reciprocal moral obligations
between the two sides. This reciprocal obligation was later given particular
emphasis by Mencius (B.C. 317-289?), who said: "If the ruler regards his subjects
as his hands and feet, the subjects will regard him as their heart. ... If, however, he
regards his subjects as dust and grass seeds, then they will regard him as their foe."
(Mencius, 8:3) Also he said that a worthy scholar was one that the ruler could not
expect to see often if he did not treat this scholar with extreme respect, still less
could the ruler have this scholar as his subject (Mencius, 18:3).
According to early Confucianism as represented by Confucius and Mencius,
such harmony and reciprocal obligation were to be brought about through education.
Much attention was thus called to human intellect as human's capacity to attain the
Dao (Tao), which was held above one's loyalty to the Son of Heaven. Xunzi (fl.
1
B.C. 298-238), for one, argued that a good person should follow the Dao rather
than follow the sovereign (Xunzi, 1985, p. 353, p. 829).
In the Western Han dynasty, however, while this Confucianist tradition did
not quite die out, the emphasis was shifted to the upholding of the absolute authority
of the sovereign. This shift was realized partly through the entering of elements of
legalism and the Huang-Lao Daoism into Confucianism (Chan, 1963, p. 134).
Confucianism thus took on new features. Lu Jia's Xinyu came at an early stage of
this ideological transition. On the one hand, it aimed at advising the sovereign to
respect or even follow the Confucianist Dao (e.g. chap. 1; chap. 11), on the other
hand, it insinuated that Confucianist traditions, rather than be merely a moral
constraint upon the imperial power, could be of service to meet the sovereign's
emergent political needs (e.g. chap. 2). The book could thus be regarded as a
document of compromise between the sovereign and Confucian intellectuals. As
such, it not only heralded the transition mentioned above but also provided a
historical perspective in which we can observe the ideological competition in the
Western Han dynasty and its culmination in the supremacy of Confucianism in the
Han court in B.C. 136 (ef. Chan, 1963, p. 271). I
It is my intention for this thesis to examine Xinyu in this light.
The thesis is divided into five sections. The first part is a review of the
theoretical frameworks and concepts I consider relevant or even applicable in this
study. This part focuses particularly on the theories and concepts adopted in this
study and the methods in which they are used. The second part is a brief
introduction about Xinyu. The third part deals with the historical background in
which the text was produced. In this section, philosophical and political contexts
will both be touched upon. The discussion will center on the direct cause of the text
as recorded in ShiMfZj, namely, the imperial command for the composition of the
text. The fourth section is a discussion of the text itself. Unlike the second part,
this part attempts both to examine some influences the previous Chinese intellectual
and political traditions had left on the text, and to investigate the various
implications the text had for its author's contemporary intellectual and political life.
In other words, as part of the feature of this part, Xinyu and its author are treated
here as an active agency capable of reacting and of exerting influences. The last
part is the conclusion of this work.





As implied above, the task of this study is to be fulfilled through an effort to
put the text in two kinds of historical contexts. Simply put, the first context has
largely to do with ideological and philosophical meanings and implications. It helps
to analyze the "prismatic colors" of influence which some major schools of thought
had cast upon the text. The second context, on the other hand, is a political one. It
is intended for an examination of the political implications of the text and for an
attempt to identify the political agenda of the author as reflected in the text.
Perhaps it should be pointed out from the outset that there seems to be hardly
a clear-cut demarcation between these two contexts, especially in the case of
premodern Chinese history. "Chinese philosophy", says Cheng Chung-ying (1987,
p. 25), "is generally most critically oriented to human existence as a whole and
refuses to draw an absolute line of demarcation between theory and practice.
"
In addition, the attribute "ideological" in the first context may cause
confusion, since "ideology" is a term with numerous definitions. In the vocabulary
of Marxism, ideology is a politically oriented term roughly meaning "a false set of
ideas perpetuated by the dominant political force" (Littlejohn, 1992, p. 247). This
Marxist concept still has relevance in social sciences. To avoid confusion wherever
possible, this thesis will often use the term in the simple sense of "world view".
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But the Marxist concept of ideology will be used largely in the conclusion of the
thesis with the application of the social theory of anthropologist Eric Wolf. Such
use of the term will be accompanied by specification.
Social sciences, generally speaking, largely involve two kinds of practices.
One is interpretation, the other explanation. The former has to do with meanings
and implications, the latter with causal relations. Admitted that the two practices do
not exhaust the activities of social scientists, they constitute an important stage in
their research. When we study a classical text which is philosophical as well as
political-such as Xinyu, it seems that the two practices become equally important
and perhaps sometimes even interdependent. Its meanings and implications provide
us with insights into the historic and political causal chains or webs that entangled it.
And such chains or webs, in their turn, are often of help to enhance our
understanding of the text.
With Xinyu, one may not find it easy to get a clear picture of the "chain" or
"web". The direct cause of the text can be easily identified in such major historical
documents as Shiji and Hanshu ; but the consequences of the text is by no means
as explicit there. As to the antecedent matter, Xu Fuguan (1976, pp. 102-105) and
Wang Liqi (1986, pp. 10-11) offered a solution by attributing several Han imperial
edicts to the influence of Xinyu. Since there lacks sufficient documental support to
such attribution, we may want to regard their attribution rather as an insightful
speculation. And one cannot fail to notice that their speculation is generally based
upon the meanings of, or rather their own understanding of, Xinyu and those edicts.
This may exemplify the dependence of explanation on interpretation. This thesis
will largely employ the same method. And I would argue that such indebtedness of
explanation to interpretation is perhaps determined less by the aforementioned lack
of reference than by an aspect of the nature of historical study.
Collingwood (1946, p. 213) sees history in terms of "the outside" and "the
inside". "By the outside of the event", says he, "I mean everything belonging to it
which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: ... By the inside of
the event I mean that in it which can only be described in terms of thought: ..."
According to Collingwood, therefore, "... the events of history are never mere
phenomena, never mere spectacles for contemplation, but things which the historian
looks, not at, but through, to discern the thought within them" (Collingwood, 1946,
p. 214). This much said, he further points out:
In thus penetrating to the inside of events and detecting the thought which
they express, the historian is doing something which the scientists need not
and cannot do. ... the historian need not and cannot (without ceasing to
be an historian) emulate the scientist in searching for the causes or law of
events. For science, the event is discovered by perceiving it, and the
further search for its cause is conducted by assigning it to its class and
determining the relation between that class and others. For history, the
object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thought expressed in
it. To discover that thought is already to understand it. After the
historian has ascertained the facts, there is no further process of inquiring
into their causes. When he knows what happened, he already knows why
it happened. (Collingwood, 1946, p. 214)
These few words may remind us of the relinquishment of the distinction
between explanation and interpretation in modern hermeneutic philosophy (cf.
Giddens, 1983, p. 5; p. 11; p. 15). By this relinquishment, it seems to actually
refer to the discarding of the explanation in functional terms. As a significant figure
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among thinkers of this school, Giddens (1983, p. 6) enunciates: "I wish to develop
an approach to social theory in which the concept of 'function' has no place; in my
view the notions of 'functional analysis' or 'functional explanation' should also be
dispensed with altogether, as resting on false premises."
Whether functional explanations are all unexceptionally and unconditionally
resting on false premises would be a discussion beyond the scope of this thesis. It
suffices to observe here that Collingwood's and Giddens' ideas seem to be valuable
in our study of Xinyu.
In his discussion on Xinyu, Xu Fuguan (1976, p. 104) points out that the
influence which Lu Jia's Xinyu left on the Han court was relatively insignificant.
Facing a "trivial" text such as this, we may easily get lost if we seek to conduct an
investigation in terms of function. But if we, drawing on Collingwood's insight, try
to find out the thought(s) that brought Xinyu into existence, note the similar
thought(s) expressed between the two sides, we may at least arrive at certain
heuristic ideas about the dynasty. As we do so, however, we need to know our
limitations. We should bear in mind that when we choose to look from this
perspective, our view is restricted by the perspective. We cannot state with
confidence that to discover the inside of an event is to know why the event happens.
To "stare at" thoughts does not always mean that there is no scenery beyond
thoughts.
Our thoughts, in a sense, are largely our subjective arrangements of what we
perceive. But especially in political life perhaps, it seems that these arrangements
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are not arbitrarily done. They are socially formed and informed, and socio-
politically conditioned. Just as Collingwood himself says:
Thinking is never done in vacuo, it is always done by a determinate
person in a determinate situation; and every historical character in every
historical situation thinks and acts as rationally as that person in that
p^li™
think n°b0dy Can d° more - (Collingw°od, 1946,
It may thus be all right to base our interpretation/explanation of an event
upon our understanding of the thought expressed in it. But in Warring States Period
(B.C. 475-221) in Chinese history, several schools of thought competed for
domination; and in early Han dynasty, some schools of thought not only competed
but also, in certain degree, amalgamated. Should we take these phenomena as the
events to be examined, could we still expect to interpret or explain these events in
terms of "the thoughts expressed" in them? If we do so, should we not be aware of
the danger of falling into the fallacy of arguing in circle? Even if this fallacy is
avoidable, how scholarly fruitful will our study be if we concentrate only on the
thought(s) that get(s) expressed in such an event as competition among thoughts? As
we try to focus our study of the competition and amalgamation among some
different schools of thought on Xinyu, these questions seem highly relevant.
The thought expressed in Xinyu can be regarded as representing that
expressed in the events of the amalgamation of several political thoughts in early
Han dynasty and, as mentioned above, of the compromise between the sovereign and
Confucian intellectuals. But if only for the purpose of facilitating our understanding
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of the thought, we still need to look at the difference in socio-political interests and
the relative manoeuver among social powers of the time. These, I should think,
constitute an important part of the historical situation of the thought. Hence the
inclusion of political context into the discussion.
Professor Ralph Faulkingham of Anthropology Department, University of
Massachusetts, recently pointed out to me that history was addressed to the
historians' contemporary issues. This notion is well developed in Marshall Sahlins
Islands of History. Towards the end of this thesis, Sahlins' cultural theory will be
included in a discussion of Lu Jia's view of history.
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CHAPTER 2
INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEXT
are
Lu Jia's biographical sketches in both Shiji and Hanshu indicate that there
twelve chapters in Xinyu. These records, while squaring nicely with the extant
version of the text, are at marked discrepancy with the "Bibliographic Treatise "
("Tinwenzhi" of Hanshu, where Xinyu is said to contain twenty-three
chapters. To add to the confusion, Wang YingliniJSJf$(1223-1296) stated that the
version available in his time had only seven chapters. It was not until about 200
years after Wang Yinglin that our twelve-chapter version emerged into circulation,
(cf. Luo Genze, 1958, p. 536) This is enough to arouse doubts about the text which
we have inherited.
In Siku Tiyao »4H&4 » for example, the authenticity of Xinyu is called into
question. The suspicion, as summarized by Hu Shi (1953, pp. 589-590) and Xu
Fuguan (1976, p. 90), is based upon three points.
The first point is that, in Hanshu, the "Biographical sketch of Sima Qian"
indicates that Shiji was composed by drawing on materials from Zhanguo Ce
1 , Chu Han Chunqiu £>|4*<, and Xinyu. But, unlike the case of other sources, the
text of Xinyu can be found nowhere throughout Shiji.
The second argument of suspicion arises from a comparison between the
extant version of Xinyu and a quotation of Lu Jia in Wang Chong's £ (27-100?)
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Lunhengjfefa. If the extant version is authentic, why are those of Lu Jia's words
quoted in Lunheng, a Han text, altogether absent in this version?
The third point argues that the quotation of Guliang Zhuan fe^-in the first
chapter of Xinyu is anachronistic. Guliang Zhuan, so goes the argument, did not
appear until the reign of the Emperor Wu of Han dynasty, which was decades later
than the period when, according to Shiji and Hanshu, the composition of Xinyu took
place.
To Yu Jiaxi (1965, pp. 518-524), however, all these points seemed
groundless.
Firstly, Yu argued to the effect that to say Sima Qian incorporated materials
of Xinyu into Shiji was a mistake on the part of Siku Tiyao. The fact is that Xinyu is
never mentioned in the "Biographical sketch of Sima Qian" in Hanshu. This
argument, incidentally, is confirmed by my own consultation of Sima Qian's
biography in Zhonghua-shuju^t^ version and "Baina" § Aversion of Hanshu.
Lu Jia's Xinyu is not mentioned in these versions. Secondly, basically agreeing with
Yan Kejun's disproof of Siku Tiyao, Yu pointed out that Wang Chong did not in any
way suggest that he had quoted Lu Jia from Xinyu. So, if Lu Jia did say those
words, he could have said the words elsewhere. Finally, like Yan Kejun, Yu
suggested that, although it was during the reign of Emperor Wu that Guliang Zhuan
was established as orthodox, its transmission had started long before this reign. For
evidence for this argument of Yu Jiaxi and Yan Kejun, it suffices to mention that
Guliang Zhuan, as a tradition of interpreting Chunqiu^i^, was initiated by a person
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named Guliang Chi&»,, who was known as alive in the first reign year of King
Nan of Zhou $fct (Huang Qingxuan, 1966, p. 240). This reign year, falling
between B.C. 314 and B.C. 313 in the Western calendar (Dong Zuobin, 1960, p.
215), was more than 170 years before the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty.
Largely drawing on the insights of Tang Yan Yan Kejun, and Yu Jiaxi
respectively, Hu Shi (1961, p. 590), Luo Genze (1958, p. 537), and Xu Fuguan
(1976, pp. 91-92) unanimously arrived at the conclusion that the extant version of
Xinyu is authentic. (1)
On my part, I would first state that these scholars' arguments seem
convincing to me. Then I would like to observe that Siku Tiyao seems rather
pejorative in suggesting that our version of the text, forged or otherwise, had
emerged before such a late period as Tang dynasty (618-907). In other words, the
emergence of the text was way too late in the speculation of Siku Tiyao. As far as it
seems to me, even if our version is not a product of early Han dynasty, there are
possibilities indicating that the version, or at least some parts of it, emerged much
earlier than the Tang era.
Siku Tiyao presents its pejorative view by citing several pre-Tang texts in
which the text of our version of Xinyu is either quoted or alluded to. Even if one
accepts these texts as adequate evidence for the pejorative view, one cannot help
noticing that there are third-century texts among those citations. This indicates that
the source of these texts existed either during or before the third century.
Admittedly, we still cannot ascertain that the specific words these texts quote or
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allude to originated from the extant version ofXfayu. But the possibility this fact
suggests is in agreement with the view that the speculation in Siku Tiyao may be too
pejorative. Now I would like to suggest one more similar possibility.
In the second chapter of Xinyu, there are these words: "Books are not
necessarily written by people like Zhongni^
; a prescription is not necessarily
prepared by Bian Que£{f|. So long as it is good to follow them [i.e. the book and
the prescription], one can follow them." (2)
In Mouzi Lihuolun fym&Hb, a parallel text can be found. It reads: "Books
are not necessarily the words of Confucius ["Kong Qiu"3lIL in the original
language]; a remedy is not necessarily prepared by Pien-ch'iao [414 ]. If a book is
in accord with what is just, one follows it. If a medicine cures, it is good."
(English translation by Ch'en, 1964, p. 39) (3)
The parallel between the two texts is obvious.
As we know, scholars who believe in the authenticity of Mouzi Lihuolun date
it variously from the end of the second to the middle of the third centuries (e.g.
Tang Yongtong, 1963, p. 121; Zhang Dongsun, 1978, p. 15; Ren Jiyu, 1981, p.
201). Even, on the other hand, those who doubt its authenticity would consider it as
a fourth or fifth century text (e.g. Ch'en, 1964, pp. 37-38; Zurcher, 1972, p. 14;
Kamata, 1982, p. 8; Lu Cheng, 1988, p. 27). Whichever was the case, Mouzi
Lihuolun existed long before the Tang dynasty.
But suppose Xinyu is a forged text, could it be that it copied from Mouzi
Lihuolun instead of the other way round?
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There seems to be very little likelihood. If the forger wanted to convince his
readers that the text had been composed by Lu Jia, why would he take the risk of
revealing himself by presenting a parallel text to a source which was evidently
written long after Lu Jia's time?
One thing we cannot exclude is that both Xinyu and Mouzi Lihuolun copied
from a common source; though we are unable thus far to ascertain the existence of
such a source. Such being the case, what I present here is not a proof, but only a
potential basis for further investigation. And as merely a potential basis, what the
parallel between the texts seems to indicate so far is, like the previous possibility,
more against than in favor of the speculation in Siku Tiyao regarding the date of
Xinyu.
Compared with Siku Tiyao, the doubts about Xinyu raised by Huang Zhen
(Zhang Xincheng, 1954, p. 629) in the Song dynasty seem more debatable.
Huang first points out that although Xinyu makes several good points, its
writing style is too elaborate to seem to be the work of such a heroic character as
Lu Jia.
This opinion is apparently based on stereotype and Huang's own reading of
the historic records about Lu Jia. Questions should be asked as to what Huang's
definitions of hero and elaborate style are, and most importantly, how and why such
style will always be negatively related to his heroes. Even if all this were clear,
Huang still needed to prove that those past historians' presentation of Lu Jia as a
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character that fits his definition of hero is a truthful reflection of Lu Jia the real
person in history.
Huang's second argument is directed to the following remark in the fifth
chapter of Xinyu: "In the dominant position, there was no sage ruler. And on the
executive level, there were no loyal and righteous officials to execute the gang of
those treacherous subjects." "Given that" asked Huang, "by examining the context
of this remark, one will realize that the author was talking about the court of Duke
Ding of Lu [of the Spring and Autumn Period], yet how could it be appropriate to
say such words at a time when the great Han dynasty was still prosperous?"
But, as we will discuss in the following chapter, the purpose of Xinyu was to
present to the emperor a brief account of how and why a dynasty would survive or
perish. A document like this usually requires much reference to historical events.
Although the language used in this remark may sound strong and forthright, it is, as
Huang himself notes, within the context of a citation of past example. A question
such as Huang's may also call for an investigation on the censorship during the
reign of the emperor of Lu Jia's time. Such investigation is lacking in Huang's
discussion of Xinyu. From the historic records available to me, I cannot find any
record of strict censorship during this reign.
Finally, Huang argues that Xinyu does not reflect Lu Jia's political view
which historic records imply that he would express in the book. The political view
Huang refers to is what Lu Jia once said to the emperor, that the terrain could be
won by force but was not to be ruled by force. My study of Xinyu leads to an
15
in
opposite conclusion. I would think that this political view is well expressed
Xinyu. Such opinion about Xinyu will be fairly evident in the following chapters of
this paper.
While there may always be room for further discussion and topics for further
debate about the authorship of a book like Xinyu, it seems so far that there is more
convincing point on the side that recognizes the book's authenticity than on the side
that denies it.
Whether we can pin the extant version down to Lu Jia seems an important
question to be addressed before deciding if we can use the text as a focus in our
study of the Han political thought. As noted above, we may rely on previous
verifications. In addition, even Siku Tiyao itself suggests ignoring the question
about its authenticity for the reason that, compared with all texts in the Han era,
Xinyu has presented a Confucianism closest to the thought of Dong Zhongshu
(B.C. 179-104)--a major figure in the Han ideology. Thus, although a conclusive
demonstration has not yet been made regarding the authorship of Xinyu, recent
scholarly opinion appears to be forming in support of Xinyu's authenticity. And
even Siku Tiyao itself admits that the extant version, to a considerable extent,
reflects the dominant ideology in the Han dynasty. Such being the case, this version





As we learn from Sima Qian and Ban Gu, Xinyu was written at the command
of Liu Bangui
, the first emperor of the Han dynasty.
In his audiences with the emperor, Master Lu on numerous occasions
expounded and praised the Book of Odes [If ] and the Book of
Documents ["f ], until one day Gaozu [i.e. Liu Bang] began to rail at
him. "All I possess I have won on horseback!" said the emperor, "why
should I bother with the Odes and Documents!"
"Your Majesty may have won it on horseback, but can you rule it on
horseback?" asked Master Lu. "Kings Tang [*] and Wu [$] in ancient
times won possession of the empire through the principle of revolt, but it
was by the principle of obedience that they assured the continuance of
their dynasties. To pay due attention to both civil and military affairs is
the way for a dynasty to achieve long life. ... If, after it had united the
world under its rule, Qin [£] had practiced benevolence and righteousness
and modeled its ways upon the sages of antiquity, how would your
Majesty ever have been able to win possession of the empire?"
The emperor grew embarrassed and uneasy and finally said to Master Lu,
"Try writing something for me on the reasons why Qin lost the empire
and I won it, and of the successes and failures of the states of ancient
times."
Master Lu accordingly set out to describe in brief the keys to political
survival and defeat in a work running to twelve sections in all. As each
section was presented to the throne, the emperor never failed to express
his delight and approval and all those about him cried, "Bravo!" The
book was given the title Xinyu. (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2699; English
translation from Watson, 1961, vol. 1, pp. 277-278) (4)
This conversation could inspire the notion that, while, as mentioned above,
Confucianists expected the sovereign to follow their tradition, what the sovereign
was interested in was whether this tradition could benefit their rule.
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As Yu Ying-shih (1980, p. 41) points out: "Confucianist Dao consists of
humanity ^ and righteousness $ ." Essential to their humanity is a close kinship
that features a filial feeling in longitudinal relations and fraternity in horizontal ones,
(cf. Confucius, 1:2, 1:6, 2:21, 8:2; Mencius, 7:27, 13:15) Confucian ideal political
system was largely modeled upon such kinship knit with such feelings.
In the introduction, we stated that Confucius' political ideal can be
summarized by his slogan: "I follow Zhou". Long before Confucius' time, the
administrative structure of the Western Zhou dynasty (B.C. 11th cent.-771) was
based upon kinship. And there was a whole set of rituals and of other institutions to
go with the power structure of this system (cf. Yang Kuan, 1965, pp. 166-196, pp.
202-208, pp. 218-233). These institutions were largely maintained in what Mote
(1971, pp. 30-33) calls the "Ju[/Ru ] tradition". This term, incidentally, is used
by Mote to refer to an officially favored political and intellectual tradition before
Confucius' time, specifically, in the Western Zhou dynasty.
British anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown (1952, p. 28) observes that "... the
social values current in a primitive society are maintained by being expressed in
ceremonial or ritual customs". Thus, according to him, the function of rituals is "to
fix and make permanent certain types of behaviour, with the obligations and
sentiments involved therein" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, p. 30).
Here, apparently, the term "primitive society" in his formulation is
questionable; because "the term ["primitive society"] is misleading if it leads one to
think of ... people who have not yet aspired to the heights of civilization. It is also
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analytically problematical, since it refers to a beginning which it does nothing to
portray" (Wolf, 1982, p. 88).
Except for this problematical term, however, it seems that Radcliffe-Brown's
view about the function of ritual is not without support from the scholarship of the
Chinese history. Akatsuka (1978, p. 24), for one, observes that the rituals in the
Zhou dynasty helped "reinforce" the coercion of the political order imposed by the
dynasty and establish a tradition that tended to make this order permanent.
Moreover, the rituals and other political institutions in the Zhou dynasty formed a
major part of what was referred to as ltffin the dynasty and, later, in Confucianist
tradition (cf. Zhang Xuecheng, 1964, p. 24; Xu Fuguan, 1979, pp. 48-49). This li,
or propriety/ies, in turn was an important part of the politics of the Zhou dynasty
(cf. Hu Anquan, 1993, pp. 109-111).
And, if one searches-to use Collingwood's term-the "inside" of the Zhou
politics, one may see the importance of the concept the "mandate of Heaven * 7" in
the Zhou ideology (5). The rulers of Zhou employed this concept to justify the war
they had waged against the previous dynasty, declaring that what they had done was
merely to execute Heaven's order to punish that dynasty (Shangshu, 1983, p. 113,
p. 146). As Hu Anquan (1993, p. 112) points out, Confucianists later incorporated
this political principle into their doctrines by playing down the penalty part while
emphasizing the virtue part.
As regards the Ju(/Ru) tradition, Confucius, in addition to declaring: "I
follow Zhou", stated: "I transmit but do not create. I believe in and love the
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ancients." (Confucius, 7:1, English translation from Chan, 1963, p. 116). Truly as
he said, the Ju/Ru tradition was best kept in, and transmitted through,
Confucianism. The proprieties (//), the music, and the education of the Ju/Ru
tradition constituted a corner stone of Confucianism (cf. Yu Ying-shih, 1976, p. 4).
Needless to say, among the three elements, the li was particularly important in that
it constituted not only the purpose of music and important content of education, but
also an expression of the Ju/Ru tradition. In the sense of such an extraordinarily
close "predecessor-inheritor" relationship, the Ju/Ru tradition and Confucian
tradition can often be regarded as one and the same tradition.
As we may see now, what later became Confucian tradition was at one time
quite in support of the sovereign.
But things changed with the decay of the Zhou dynasty. This study would
rule out the investigation about the cause(s) of this change. It will content itself
with an effort to point out that, in the Warring States Period, if not earlier, those in
power largely began to either lost interest in, or be skeptical about, the Ju/Ru
tradition--which, as discussed above, was best represented by Confucianism and can
often be treated as identical with Confucian tradition. When Gongsun Yang
(B.C. 343-277) practiced political persuasion to Duke Xiao of Qin^'u , the duke
could not help dosing off while Gongsun Yang talked about "didao"'?Cand
"wangdao"Ivl, two doctrines basically of Confucianist tradition (Sima Qian, 1969,
p. 2228). Giving audience to Mencius, King Hui of Liang ^,|.£ accosted this major
Confucianist of the time with the question: "Am I to suppose you will bring much
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benefit to my state, old man?" His question was quite to the disappointment of
Mencius, whose concern was "humanity" and "righteousness" rather than benefit
(Mencius, 1:1). Also during the Warring States Period, King Zhao of Qin^flSf
once remarked bluntly: "Confucianists are of no good to human governments."
(Xunzi, 1985, p. 152) All such examples indicate that, by this time at latest, the
practical side, the "usefulness", of this tradition was called in question; despite that
in the Zhou dynasty, it had been taken extremely seriously. Needless to mention,
perhaps, during the Qin dynasty (221-206 b.c), Confucianism was hardly active in
court; even though it was not extinguished as a school of thought (Du Kuiying,
1973, pp. 13-14). All this seems to more or less resonate with the contemptuous
tone of Liu Bang's remark: "All I possess I have won on horseback! Why should I
bother with the Odes and Documents!"
Therefore, if Lu Jia intended to persuade the emperor from the view point of
Confucianism, he had to make Confucianism seem practical enough.
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CHAPTER 4
SIGNIFICANCE AND INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE
Humanity and Righteousness
Xinyu starts by presenting the Dao as a product begotten by a compound
between Heaven/Nature on the one hand and sages' exploitsw and merits on the
other. It says: "As the ancient teaching goes: 'The Heaven creates myriad creatures
and has the earth to nurture them. The sage helps them to fulfil themselves.' Once
the operation is compounded by [the sages'] exploits and merits, the Dao is
created." (Lu Jia, 1986, p. 1) In other words, man and the Heaven are united
through the Dao. This formulation is followed by a brief description about how a
wide range of natural phenomena contribute to the well-being of man. Then, the
author proceeds to state that Nature "enwraps human beings with [the extremes of]
six directions, arranges them with orderly social relations, set them right with
disasters, and informs them with good omens". In such a statement, the Heaven and
human society are united. But what he has described in the statement is still how
the Heaven/Nature does its part for this harmonious unity. And the statement
obviously implicates an unequal relationship between the Heaven and man. It is the
Heaven that has the authority over what is correct and what is incorrect in the
human world and to exert influence to "arrange", to reform, and to "inform" the
humans. But the Heaven, "operating with constant regularity" (Xunzi, 1985, p.
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445), will not do everything for the humans-whose "Way" constantly changes (Lu
Jia, 1986, p. 52). In the rest of the paragraph, Lu Jia gives an elaborate account of
how, in different times in the past, the major problems in the world were solved by
different sages. This is meant to show how humans should do their part to make the
work of the Heaven complete. And while doing so, he gradually reaches the
argument that humanity and righteousness constitute the key to successful
government.
Such a unity of man and the Heaven may echo the belief in the mandate of
Heaven in Zhou dynasty. Without doubt, this view point in Xinyu and the concept
of the mandate of Heaven are very closely related. For instance, in the above
narration, each sage at a particular time had a particular mission to carry out on
earth as required, implicitly, by the Heaven's demand for the harmony and well-
being of the whole unity. In this sense, in this narration, the concept of the
Heaven's mandate is incorporated or implied rather than directly employed. Our
later discussion about Lu Jia's indebtedness to Xunzi will show more of the
difference. To the sovereign, the mandate of Heaven did not always seem pleasant.
If this concept, as discussed above, might have the potential to justify the rule of a
sovereign, it might at the same time be capable of threatening it; because attempts to
usurp the empire could also be made in the name of this mandate. This may be well
exemplified in the following conversation in Shiji and Hanshu.
Master Yuan Gu, grand tutor to the King of Qinghe, ... once ... was
having an argument with a certain Master Huang in the presence of
Emperor Jing [(188-141 b.c.) of the Han dynasty]. "King Tang [&], the
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founder of the Shang dynasty, and King Wu the founder of the
Zhou, did not receive any 'mandate of Heaven' to do what they did "
declared Master Huang. "They simply assassinated their sovereigns' and
set up their own dynasties!"
"That is not so!" protested Master Yuan Gu. "Jie ®, the last ruler of the
Xia dynasty [B.C. 21st-16th cent.?], and Zhou [*}], the last ruler of the
Shang dynasty [B.C. 16th-llth cent.?], were both cruel tyrants, and the
people of the empire turned away from them in their hearts and gave their
allegiance to Tang and Wu. Tang and Wu were acting in accordance with
the hearts of the empire when they overthrew and punished Jie and Zhou
The subjects of Jie and Zhou refused to serve them any longer but gave
their allegiance to Tang and Wu, who had no other choice than to set up
their own dynasties. Is this not what it means to receive the mandate of
Heaven?"
But Master Huang replied, "A hat, no matter how old, belongs on the
head, and shoes, no matter how new, belong on the feet! Why? Because
there is a difference between top and bottom! Now, although Jie and
Zhou were unprincipled men, they were still sovereigns, and although
Tang and Wu were sages, they were still subjects. When a ruler commits
some fault, if his subjects fail to correct his words and reform his actions
in order to restore the position of the Son of Heaven to its full dignity, but
instead use his errors as an excuse to 'punish' him and set themselves up
in his place, facing south calling themselves the rulers, what is this but a
case of assassination of one's liege lord?"
"If what you say is true," said Master Yuan Gu, "then was Emperor
Gaozu [i.e. Liu Bang] likewise at fault when he replaced the ruler of the
Qin dynasty and became Son of Heaven?"
At this point Emperor Jing intervened. "No one accuses a man of lacking
good taste in food because he eats other meats but refrains from eating
[such deadly poisonous thing as] horse liver," he said, "and no one
considers a scholar stupid because he discusses other questions but does
not discuss the matter of whether or not Tang and Wu received the
mandate of Heaven!" He thereupon dismissed the two men. (Sima Qian,
1969, pp. 3122-3123, English translation from Watson, 1961, vol. 1,
pp. 403-404)
From this conversation, one can see that the mandate of Heaven can
justify both the ascendence of the new ruler to the throne and the subversion of
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the current ruler. Yet, even though-as will be discussed later-without directly
resorting to the concept mandate of Heaven, Lu Jia still made a strong argument
in explaining the fate of rulers in terms of whether humanity and righteousness
are practiced (e.g. Lu Jia, 1986, p. 25; pp. 28-29; p. 51; p. 152; p. 160).
But Liu Bang had often expressed his contempt toward Confucianists
openly (e.g. Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2603; p. 2692). How could he be expected to
agree with Lu Jia about the usefulness of humanity and righteousness?
It seems generally known that almost every school of thought in pre-Qin
period had its own Dao. However, while, as cited above, pointing out that
Confucianist Dao largely consists of humanity and righteousness, Yu Ying-shih
(1980, pp. 51-57) suggests that it would pay off to see what different Daos of
different schools shared in common. He further argues that what all schools had
in common is that they all sought to influence politics by way of an emphasis
upon their Daos' historical heritage and their Daos' preoccupation with human
world.
In the history of the Han dynasty, Liu Bang's dependence upon Zhang
Liang&£.(? -B.C. 189) is evident. With his knowledge gained from the book
The Grand Duke's Art of War >K(also know as Taigong Liutao A'u^fjor
Liutao), Zhang Liang played a major role in helping Liu Bang to "win" the
empire "on horseback".
From time to time Zhang Liang expounded The Grand Duke's Art of War
to the governor of Pei [i.e. Liu Bang]. The latter greatly admired the
book and always followed the strategies which the book outlined, but
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when Zhang Liang discussed the book with other men they refused to payhim any heed. (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2036; English translation from
Watson, 1961, vol. 1, p. 136)
Based on this passage, one has reason to assume that Liu Bang was, to some
degree, familiar with the text of The Grand Duke's Art of War.
The Grand Duke's Art of War is normally subsumed under categories other
than Confucianist document (6). According to the exploration conducted by Yu
Jiaxi (1965, p. 582), this book had been, for a large part, in circulation by the
founding of the Han dynasty. A comparison between Xinyu and two extant, non-
overlapping versions of The Grand Duke's Art of War led me to the discovery that
the function performed by Lu Jia's "sages" and that by the "sage" in The Grand
Duke 's Art of War were presented in a strikingly similar narrative style. The same
is true with the humanity and righteousness in Xinyu and the Dao in The Grand
Duke's Art of War. (7)
The above passage in Shiji has shown us how important The Grand Duke's
Art of War was to Liu Bang. If the parts of the text we read were available to Liu
Bang, then, as he read Xinyu, the afore-mentioned similarity in narrative style would
be likely to induce him to consider as identical the sage and Dao in the former text
and the sages, the Dao, the humanity, and the righteousness in the latter. In other
words, he might transfer to the latter text a considerable amount of admiration he
had for the former text. As he did so, he could be influenced by the points of the
latter text.
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Besides, while humanity and righteousness constitute the Dao in
Confucianism, they are not monopolized by Confucianism. During pre-Qin period,
quite a few other schools of thought also touched upon their usefulness and
importance. It is worth noting that, among such texts, there are such political text
as Guarw*g3-(e.g. the chapter entitled "Mumin" <&*,), and military texts as Sima
Fa^^(e.g. Chapters 1 and 2) and WeiliaoMi^H^ Chapter 23). Granted that
there is difference between mentioning certain idea in limited context and making
the idea the center of a philosophy, such difference as well as the "limit" of the
context often tend to be overlooked by persons with little scholarly interest. Should
Liu Bang, as a politician tempered in battlefields, have had any (direct or indirect)
contact with these texts, he would be likely to favorably consider Lu Jia's effort to
expound humanity and righteousness-especially when there was such a cliche in the
Han dynasty that the decay of the previous dynasty had been due to its lack of these
virtues. The emperor's "approval" of Xinyu may thus indicate that the imperial
power was now ready to compromise with Confucianist principles.
Xunzi
But to compromise, as generally known, is to meet each other half way. To
make it possible, there needed to be flexibility on the part of Confucianism as well.
In early Han dynasty, some Confucianists already seemed very flexible about
their principles. This could be exemplified in the adaptation of Confucianist
tradition by Shusun Tongfo#i|(fl. 206-194).
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Shusun Tong customarily wore the robes of a Confucian scholar but
because the king of Han [i.e. Liu Bang] had such dislike for his 'costume
he changed to a short robe cut in the fashion of Chu£
, which pleased the
king ... In the fifth year of Han, ... the nobles joined in conferring upon
the king of Han the title of Supreme Emperor at Dingtao, [The
emperor's] followers and ministers were given to drinking and wrangling
over their respective achievements, some shouting wildly . others
drawing their swords and hacking at the pillars of the palace', so that
Emperor Gaozu worried about their behavior. (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2722
English translation from Watson, 1961, vol. 1, pp. 292-293)
At this moment, Shusun Tong offered to draw up a court ritual with his
disciples and some scholars of Lu . The emperor's requirement was that the
ritual should be "easy to learn" and be "the sort of thing" he, the emperor, could
perform. Two years later, when the ritual they had designed was first performed,
the emperor's comment was: "Today for the first time I realize how exalted a thing
it is to be an emperor!" (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2723)
Granted that, as the above argument of Akatsuka suggests, the rituals of the
Zhou dynasty functioned to reinforce the coercion of the political order which the
dynasty had imposed, the central objects to which the rituals were directed were still
largely ancestry and gods (cf. Li Zehou, 1986, pp. 10-11; Yang Kuan, 1965, pp.
166-180). Shusun Tong's rituals did not lead the emperor to hold ancestry, gods, or
the Heaven in awe but made him feel "exalted" instead. It is no wonder Zhu Xi
(1130-1200) observes that what Shusun Tong used was "merely the method of the
Qin dynasty to uphold the sovereign while humble the subjects" (cf. Yu Ying-shih,
1976, p. 32). Zhu Xi's observation seems to be based on historical records. In
Shiji, for example, one hears Shusun Tong say: "It is my desire to select from a
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number of ancient codes of rituals, as well as from the ceremonies of Qin, and make
a combination of these." (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2722) And Sima Qian's remark is
that the rituals Shusun Tong drew up were largely based upon those during the Qin
dynasty (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 1159).
Perhaps this was the main reason why two Confucian scholars of Lu refused
to work with Shusun Tong. "What you are doing" said they, "is not in accord with
the ways of antiquity. ... Now go away and do not defile us [by asking us to work
with you]!" (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 2722) What they referred to as "the ways of
antiquity" is presumably the tradition of the Zhou dynasty. Notice that these two
scholars were from Lu. We learn from Zuozhuan that Lu was a place where the
tradition of the Zhou dynasty-such as Zhou lij^l-was best retained (Zuozhuan,
1981, p. 257, p. 1227). This feature of Lu is also noted in Shiji (Sima Qian, 1969,
p. 3116) and Honshu (Ban Gu, 1970, p. 3591). The tradition seems to have lasted
long. When Liu Bang's troops besieged Lu after Xiang Ji^jft (B.C. 232-202) had
killed himself, the Confucianists of Lu kept on discussing and reciting classics,
performing music and rites, in spite of the besiegement (Ban Gu, 1970, P. 3592).
Now back to the two scholars. Shusun Tong dismissed these scholars as
"pig-headed Confucianists" who did not "know that times had changed". This
encounter between him and the two scholars of Lu may indicate that the Ju/Ru
tradition had broken with imperial power.
Such being the case, it now seems that Shusun Tong and the two scholars at
Lu stood for the two extremes among the choices which Lu Jia could make. If he
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chose to win the favor of the imperial power, he might need to discard much of the
essence of Confucianism-as did Shusun Tong. If, on the other hand, he decided to
stick to Confucian doctrines, he could consider following the two scholars.
Fortunately for him, there was no such dilemma. With a reformed
Confucianism, he did have a chance to meet the imperial power half way. Such
Confucianism is embodied by Xunzi.
In his preface to Xinyu Jiaozhu, Wang Liqi (1986, pp. 7-9) gives a quite
comprehensive account of Lu Jia's indebtedness to Xunzi. He points out to us
numerous places in Xinyu where Xunzi's work is quoted or alluded to. I would
argue that Lu Jia's indebtedness to Xunzi signifies an important aspect of the new
feature of Confucianism in early Han dynasty.
As Hu Anquan's above-cited argument goes, Confucianists expounded the
"virtue" part in the political principle of the Zhou dynasty while played down the
penalty part. Confucius said:
Lead the people with governmental measures and regulate them by law
and punishment, and they will avoid wrongdoing but will have no sense of
honor and shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by the rules
of propriety, and they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, set
themselves right. (Confucius, 2:3; English translation from Chan, 1963, p.
22)
But in Xunzi's doctrines, punishment has become an important
complement of propriety (cf. Luo Jun, 1935, pp. 226-227). And Xunzi, unlike
many other Confucianists up to his time, would discuss military affairs with
nobles (Xunzi, 1985, pp. 378-415). With him, to attain propriety and to
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strengthen state power are mutually dependent and constitute a two-fold purpose
for his doctrines (cf. Xunzi, 1985, pp. 192-226)~though, between the two sides,
it is often the importance of propriety that bears more emphasis. In being
considerate to rulers' wish to make their rule permanent, his Confucianism is
more benign to imperial powers than that of the Ju/Ru-Confucius tradition since
the Zhou dynasty.
In addition, Xunzi's notion of "following [the examples of] contemporary
kings'* has the potential to be understood as an advocate of the loyalty to the
contemporary sovereign and the depreciation of upholding some past tradition
above the sovereign. This notion left much influence on Lu Jia. In the second
chapter of Xinyu, Lu Jia (1986, p. 39) says: "To talk about the ancient times in
negligence to the contemporary sovereign is comparable to abandoning one's own
sovereign to serve other sovereigns." But in Xunzi, to follow contemporary
kings can be a means to follow "past kings"
; because "the past and the
present are one" (Xunzi, 1985, p. 103). Since, as he implies, the past is remote
and the present belongs to the same tradition as the past, followers of this
tradition may as well start from the present (cf. Xunzi, 1985, pp. 59-60).
Obviously, in such a notion as following contemporary kings, the upholding of
Confucian principles and the loyalty to the contemporary government are both
given due attention. It thus constituted an ideal approach for Confucianists like
Lu Jia to compromise with their contemporary imperial power.
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Xunzi also believed in the unity of the Heaven and man. But this belief was not
based upon the mandate of Heaven. He said:
Nature (Tian, Heaven) operates with constant regularity. It does not exist
or the sake of (sage emperor) Yao % not does it cease to exist because of
(wicked king) Jie^
. Respond to it with peace and order, and good
fortune will result. Respond to it with disorder, and disaster will follow
(Xunzi, 1985, p. 445) (8)
With Xunzi, political powers in domination would not feel threatened by the
mandate of Heaven. But they were warned that whether their empire would thrive
or perish would be contingent upon their own conduct as well as on how they ruled
the empire. From Xunzi's point of view, Lu Jia says:
The sun and the moon remained the same during [the reigns of] Yao and
Shun, their states thrived. The stars did not change during [the reigns of]
Jie and Zhou, but their states perished. This is because the Way of
Heaven will not change whereas the Way of humans will. (Lu Jia, 1986
p. 152)
To prevent the empire from perishing, rulers should thus act within limits of
propriety and rules (cf. Lu Jia, 1986, p. 154). This kind of advice seems to have
attended to both the Confucianist Dao and the sovereign's wish to rule for ever.
Such could be interpreted as the terms offered to the imperial power in exchange for
Confucian intellectuals' support, service, and loyalty-though Lu Jia might not
necessarily have intended it to be so.
Lu Jun (1935, p. 183) indicates to the effect that Xunzi heralded the
Confucianists of the Han dynasty. Lu Jia was without doubt among those
intellectuals in the dynasty who initiated this new phase of Confucianism.
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Huang-Lao Daoism
By the time of early Han dynasty, Huang-Lao Daoism had become very
much in fashion, especially among the administrative circle (cf. Wang Liqi, 1986,
pp. 11-14; Cheng Wu, 1974, pp. 43-47; Yu Ying-shih, 1976, p. 14). Between the
two figures in this school of thought, Laozi is perhaps better known for the advocate
of "non-action"^.
Confronting the concept of "non-action" and Laozi's "ideals of weakness and
emptiness", one should not-as Chan (1963, p. 137) warns-mistake his as "a
philosophy of negativism or one of absolute quietism". In Chapter 37 of Daode
Jingtift&Mi, Laozi says: "Dao usually takes no action, and yet there is nothing that it
fails to accomplish." The idea of "non-action" is therefore still to ensure
accomplishment. He goes on in Chapter 57 to demonstrate how "non-action" can be
applied to state politics.
Govern the state with correctness. Operate the army with surprise tactics.
Administer the empire by engaging in no activity. How do I know this
should be so? Through this: The more taboos and prohibitions there are
in the world, the poorer the people will be. The more cunning and skill
man possesses, the more vicious things will appear. The more laws and
orders are made prominent, the more thieves and robbers there will be.
Therefore the sage says: I take no action and the people of themselves are
transformed. I love tranquillity and the people of themselves become
correct. I engage in no activity and the people of themselves become
prosperous. I have no desire and the people of themselves become
simple. (Laozi, chap. 57; English translation from Chan, 1963, p. 166)
However, Laozi's doctrines seem too abstract and metaphysical to be of
much practical value for politicians. As Yu Ying-shih (1976, p. 13) points out,
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Laozi did not have much influence in politics until the political philosophy of
Huang-Lao Daoism developed into maturity, especially when Huang-Lao Daoism
had mingled with Legalism.
This newly-emerged political philosophy featured a dual emphasis on the Dao
and the upholding of sovereign through the imposition of laws. In the paradigm of
this philosophy, the sovereign is a link through which the Dao reaches human
society. "Daoyuan-igi?.
, a document of Huang-Lao philosophy unearthed during
1970's, says: "Once the sage king uses this [i.e. the Dao], the whole terrain under
the sun will be in order." (Mawangdui Hanmu Boshu Zhengli Xiaozu, 1974, p. 42)
The Dao in this new philosophy is not unlike Laozi 's Dao. It is a mystical
immense void known as One (Mawangdui Hanmu Boshu Zhengli Xiaozu, 1974, p.
42). But the Legalism in this philosophy, as a product of the Dao (Mawangdui
Hanmu Boshu Zhengli Xiaozu, 1974, p. 30), is absent in Laozi's doctrines. In this
philosophy, "to rule by laws is the best [form] of politics." (Mawangdui Hanmu
Boshu Zhengli Xiaozu, 1974, p. 31. It will maintain the socio-political order so that
both sovereign and the subjects would be in their right position (Mawangdui Hanmu
Boshu Zhengli Xiaozu, 1974, p. 32). Yu Ying-shih (1976, p. 12) rightly observes
that it is such advocate of ruling by laws that found favor in the eyes of sovereign.
In Xinyu, Lu Jia says: "There is no Dao that is greater than non-action. ...
To practice non-action is the same thing as to take action." Judging him by these
words, one may have reason to say that Lu Jia "was under the influence of Huang-
Lao Daoism" (Wang Liqi, 1986, p. 14). Especially, in the chapter in Xinyu about
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"the foundation of the Dao" (Lu Jia, 1986, pp. 1-7), the Dao is described in a very
similar way as in Huang-Lao Daoism (Mawangdui Hanmu Boshu Zhengli Xiaozu,
1974, p. 42). Both presented the Dao as essential in maintaining the orders of the
cosmos and of human society. Yet one needs to be cautious at this point. It seems
that, for Lu Jia, to be under the influence of Huang-Lao Daoism did not mean to
accept all of its doctrines.
It is to be noted that the notion of applying "non-action" to politics may not
yet be very far from Confucius' teachings. Confucius himself occasionally
expressed the notion (Confucius, 4:10, 15:5). He believed that by remaining
righteous in everything (4:10) and remaining reverent all the time (15:5), a ruler
could rule the empire without taking action. Xunzi also averred that by leaving his
mind and feelings etc. in their pure, undisturbed natural state, a sage ruler could
round out Heaven's work. And, according to him, the reason to round out Heaven's
work was that Heaven could "succeed without effort, obtain without pursuit" (Xunzi,
1985, p. 447)~exactly the same words to be used by Wang Bi (226-249) to annotate
the 38th chapter of Laozi's Daode Jing, only the order of the two clauses is
reversed. (9). But, as discussed above, Confucius was against resorting to the law-
such as imposing penalty. And in Xunzi, the use of laws should be accompanied by
propriety.
As one reads Xinyu, one will notice that Lu Jia strongly objected to ruling
the empire by resorting to penalty. In Chapter 1 of Xinyu, he says: "By upholding
virtue, Duke Huan of Qi #^^[fl. B.C. 656] accomplished hegemony. Wielding
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punishment, the Second Emperor of Qin [fL B.C. 209] lost his empire." (Lu Jia,
1986, p. 129). In Chapters 3 and 4, he argued that the reason the Qin dynasty had
perished was that it based the empire on the rule of punishment (p. 51, p. 62). In
Chapter 8, he observed that to depend upon punishment would scare people away
(p. 1 17). Therefore, while Lu Jia was under the influence of Huang-Lao Daoism, it
yet seems justifiable to regard Xinyu as partly its author's effort to reform this new
political theory by means of Confucianism. Or, to say the least, Xinyu had the
potential to mitigate the influence of legalism in Huang-Lao Daoism; though whether
or how much the potential went into effect is yet to be studied.
Lu Jia interpreted "non-action" in politics as ruling by propriety, music,
education, etc. (Lu Jia, 1986, pp. 59-67) Unlike Confucius, who used the notion of
"non-action" as a means to emphasize the importance of virtue for a ruler, Lu Jia
presented the notion itself as his supreme Dao in his philosophy, declaring: "There
is no Dao that is greater than non-action". In such a practice, Huang-Lao Daoism
seems to be adapted and incorporated in Confucianism. We may have no way to
ascertain whether Xinyu exemplifies, among other things, a strategy which
Confucianists employed to compete with Huang-Lao Daoism. But as we know,
many of Liu Bang's meritorious officials were believers of Huang-Lao Daoism (cf.
Wang Liqi, 1986, p. 12). Surrounded and often influenced by these subjects, Liu
Bang may not have taken Xinyu with quick approval if there had been no




In discussing Xinyu, this study has often brought Liu Bang, the emperor
during whose reign Xinyu was composed, into focus, examining how he would
possibly take Lu Jia's book. This is due to the following three reasons.
First, Xinyu was written at the emperor's command and this study sees it in
light of the compromise between Confucian intellectuals and the imperial power. To
bring the emperor into focus is part of the effort to examine the persuasive force of
Xinyu.
Second, the sovereign stood at the center of the political power during
dynastical times. To estimate the text's potential for political influence in the
empire, some attempts need to be made to look at how the central power-the
imperial power-would react to it.
The third reason is to a large degree related to the previous two. To estimate
the persuasive force of a political text, one should bear in mind that the effect of this
force was often based upon, and conditioned by, 1) the cultural heritage handed
down to its time, and 2) its contemporary socio-political situations. But while one
studies the cultural and political backgrounds of the text, one may frequently find
that the actions and thoughts of the dominant social group-with the sovereign at its
center-are the focus of attention in relevant (premodern) historical records, be they
records of the cultural heritage or of the socio-political situation where the author of
the text found himself. In other words, those records are what Sahlins calls "elite
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history, narrated with an eye singular to the higher politics" (Sahlins, 1985, p. 32).
Yet, very often, those records are the only sources available to present-day
scholarship. The scope of our investigation is therefore restricted. Therefore, as
we investigate the text's persuasive force and potential of influence, we have to
make do with such records that center on "the higher politics".
Through this study on Xinyu, efforts have been made to secure a glimpse of
the new features of Confucianism during early Han dynasty. This newly-emerged
Confucianism differed from the Confucianism of Zhou tradition-as represented by
Confucius and Mencius-in that it was based on Xunzi's doctrines with Huang-Lao
Daoism mingled in it. As a text produced at the early phase of this transition,
Xinyu, unlike many major (Confucianist) political texts after it, was not quite under
the influence of Legalism, which is a political theory all for the sovereign. But its
rationale of Confucianist principles is already that the principles are necessary to
meet the needs of the sovereign.
As a by-product of the efforts, this study implied the difference between
Huang-Lao Daoism and the original Daoism of Laozi. While the original Daoism
advocated reclusive life (e.g. Zhuangzi) and a laissez-faire policy for the people
(e.g. Laozi), Huang-Lao Daoism was prominently intended to serve a centralized
monarchy.
The emergence of the Han Confucianism and the dominance of Huang-Lao
Daoism marked the completion of the ideological (10) transition from Spring and
Autumn Period (B.C. 770-476) to the dynastical times in the Chinese history.
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During the former period down to much of the Warring States Period, most of the
major schools of thought upheld their Daos above political power (cf. Yu Ying-shih,
1980, pp. 38-51). But the Han Confucianism and Huang-Lao Daoism of the latter
period featured the serviceability of their Daos to a hegemonic government.
As discussed above, in Huang-Lao Daoism, the Dao is presented as essential
to the maintenance of the order in the cosmos as well as in the human society. In
this respect, this supernatural entity known as the Dao can be regarded as a
counterpart of Xunzi's notion of "propriety". In Xunzi, "propriety" is something
because of which "the heaven and the earth operate in harmony, the sun and the
moon shine, the seasons proceed orderly, ... the feelings of happiness and anger
occur appropriately, the ruled can be manageable, the ruling can be sage" (Xunzi,
1985, p. 520). In Xinyu, Lu Jia followed Huang-Lao Daoism by identifying such
supernatural force with the Dao. At the same time, he endowed this Dao with
Confucianist contents of "propriety". In other words, he agreed with Huang-Lao
Daoists that it was the Dao that maintained the order in the cosmos and human
world and that the greatest Dao was "non-action". But, to him, what this "non-
action" meant was the dependence upon nothing other than Confucianist virtues and
proprieties and the practice of "following the contemporary kings". Such
combination of Confucianism and Huang-Lao Daoism itself set the structures of the
dominant political thoughts in the Western Han dynasty.
In discussing the ideological models of what he refers to as "tributary
societies", Eric Wolf—under the influence of Marx—remarks:
39
Although one model may become dominant in a given [political-economic]
orbit [of cultural interaction], as did the Confucian model carried by the
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Even though Confucian model did not become dominant during Liu
Bang's reign, Xinyu does seem to reflect the coexistence and competition which
Wolf mentions.
And the sovereign's readiness to accept Lu Jia's theory seems to have
corresponded with the maturity of the Chinese dynastical state as a form of
political institution. One may reach this conclusion through a comparison
between the Qin dynasty and the Han dynasty in the aspect of political
propaganda~an important element in any ideological model.
About his above-mentioned ideological models, Wolf further observes:
Typically they show a hierarchical representation of the cosmos, in which
the dominant supernatural order, working through the major holders of
power, encompasses and subjects humanity. At the same time, the
ideological model displaces the real relation between power-wielding
surplus takers and dominated producers onto the imagined relation
between superior and inferior "subject" (...). The problem of public
power is thus transformed into a problem of private morality, and the
"subject" is invited to win merit by maintaining order through the
regulation of his own conduct. The displacement also embodies a
contradiction. If public power falters and justice is not done, the
ideological ties linking subject and supernatural are also called into
question. The rulers lose legitimacy; the mandate of Heaven may pass to
alternate contenders, or the official apparatus of mediation. Yet the
arguments proffered in support of these claims will center upon the nature
of the imaginary tie between subject and supernatural, not upon the nature
of domination anchored in "other than economic reasons." (Wolf, 1982, p.
83)
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Since the Han times, the occurrence of this ideological cycle had frequently
accompanied the succession of one dynasty to another; though the model itself may
have begun to take shape in the Zhou dynasty at latest (cf Hu Anquan, 1993, pp.
111-112).
But the Qin dynasty was different.
First, Qin's successful annexation of the other six warring states was usually
attributed-rather than to the Heaven's will-to the spirits of the emperor's own
ancestry ("Jfrtttif-, (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 236, p. 239), to the emperor's
own virtue (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 250), sageness (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 243), and
superhuman quality ("ftfctftt") (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 239, p. 254), even to the
emperor's "mercifulness" ("i'^M ,*ft&*f) (Sima Qian, 1969, p. 249), etc. Yet
these may not be significant enough; because they are expressions common to later
dynasties as well. But what is noteworthy in these documents is the evidential
scarcity in the authors' respect to the Heaven. (11)
Second, the difference can be seen in the Qin politicians' declaration that
their emperor was more praiseworthy than the legendary "Three Kings and Five
Emperors" 5 * *'f of the past (e.g. Sima Qian, 1969, p. 236). As we know, these
ancient kings and emperors were usually presented as early inheritors in the heritage
of the Heaven's mandate (e.g. Mencius, 9:5, 9:6). To deny them as models to
follow was to cut oneself off this line of heritage. Without availing themselves of
this tradition, the Qin politicians had to base their ideological model heavily upon
the alleged "invincibility" of the ruler, which the revengeful nobles of the six states
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were more than eager to question and challenge. In this sense, the Qin empire was
established on top of a volcano. Either the importance of the heritage was not
recognized or the social-political circumstances rendered it impossible to resort to
this tradition, the Qin political propaganda revealed the immaturity of a new political
institution.
For Sahlins (1985, p. ix), culture can be regarded figuratively as "a gamble
played with nature, in the course of which, wittingly or unwittingly ... the old
names that are still on everyone's lips acquire connotations that are far removed
from their original meaning." Therefore, if "culture is precisely the organization of
the current situation in the terms of a past" (Sahlins, 1985, p. 155), it can also be
the constructed organization of a past in the terms of the current situation. It is
human to reorganize the relations of significance among, and come up with new
interpretations about, past events so as to build up arguments which are meant to
address current issues. Hence Sahlins remarks that "cultural schemes are
historically ordered, since to a greater or lesser extent the meanings are revalued as
they are practically enacted" (Sahlins, 1985, p. vii).
In Xinyu, the cosmos and human society are organized in the terms of
Confucianist Dao. The author rationalizes such organization with a presentation of
the past in the same terms. Such a display of the previous history indicates that the
Dao is a ruler's only access to a successful rule of the empire. This is part of the
Han Confucianists' current political agenda to bring the imperial power into the orbit
of their Dao. What they would offer in return was a social order strongly favoring
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the power. For the sovereign, such an order could be expected because, once he
promised to step into the orbit, he would be held as the highest representative of the
Dao and the highest maintainor of the well-being of human kind in this world. In
such case, any person who in any way defied his rule would be regarded not as
merely an individual with some grievance against a particular government but as a
public enemy that disturbed the social order in the human world and thereby
threatened the harmony between the Heaven and man. This individual could thus be
subjected to physical extinction in the name of the well-being of that organic whole.
Therefore this logic had a twofold potential to prevent a sovereign from being "too
ruthless" and to strengthen and justify the coercion under the sovereign's rule.
From the perspective of Collingwood, such logic constituted the "inside" of the
prevalent practice of basing juridical decision upon Confucian classics &M0®n the
Han dynasty (Yu Ying-shih, 1976, pp. 35-37; Xu Fuguan, 1976, p. 103; Xia
Changpu, 1978, pp. 128-138; e.g. Huan Kuan, chap. 8 of vol. 2). (12) And by this
same logic, an official in the Song dynasty associated the state of being disloyal in









Y^' S Yan Kejun>S discussi<™ are in the form of preface of
Xinyu.^ Tang Yan s text is collected in the serial of Longxi Jingshe Kmt, YanKejun s in his Tieqiao MangaoHmm Neither book is available to me for themoment. I had access to Tang's and Yan's prefaces respectively in pages 222-223
and pages 214-215 of Wang Liqi's Xinyu Jiaozhu. *
™
lS)^ 44)
8inal tCXt: *^*4*****«W fetftM*..- Jia
,
(3) . The original text: to*^4t4«*Mtt.tfc+titoftfc (Mouzi, 1965)
(4) . Throughout this paper, I basically adopt Burton Watson's (1961) English
translation of Sima Qian's Shiji with some adaptations. (For example, the
romanization in Watson's translation is converted to the Pinyin system in this paper
In Watson's translation, the title of Lu Jia's book is New Discourse, but it is known
as Xinyu in this paper.)
(5) & (10). "Ideology" as a Marxian term, meaning "a false set of ideas perpetuated
by the dominant force" (Littlejohn, 1992, p. 247)
(6) . In the "Bibliographic Treatise" of Honshu, however, there is a book entitled
Liutaox.it under the category of Confucianist text (cf. Ban Gu, 1970, p. 1725). But
according to Siku Tiyao, this book is not identical with The Grand Duke's Art of
War (cf. Yu Jiaxi, 1965, pp. 580).
(7) . For example, Lu Jia (1986, p. 1):
n$o)\±*>&,>**%iJi^£to1&$&k*1i&,tt&i
&»M'M£ia>4'ffl^^ (Translation: As the ancient teaching
goes: "The Heaven created myriad creatures and has the earth nurture them. The
sage helps them to fulfil themselves. Once the operation is compounded by [the
sage's] exploits and merits, the Dao is created." Hence it is said that [the Heaven]
sets the sun and the moon in right positions, the four seasons in right sequence,
makes the yin and the yang in harmony, spread the qi and cultivates the nature [of
all creatures], arranges [such] five [basic] elements [as the mu (wood), the huo
(fire), the shui (water), the jin (metal), and the tu (earth)], enlivens creatures in the
spring, lets them grow in the summer, makes them prolific in the autumn, and




tf/"¥x*{,*JUt*At,*WWd" (Translation: The four seasons are from the heaven, the myriad
creatures from the earth. There are the masses under the sun to be tended by the
sage, as livestock are to be tended by a herder. The Dao of the spring is to create.
All creatures in spring will thrive. The Dao of the summer is to grow. All
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creatures in summer will be mature. The Dao of the autumn is to collect. All
CreaUires in autumn will be plump. The Dao of the winter is to retain All
ZTZTfar ZTl w bC qUiCtu - ThC cooperating [with the Nature], setsthe rule for the whole terrain. Hence the terrain is in order )Lu Jia: (1986, p. 29) "Ml I****, "
(Translation: A plan not based upon [the principles of] humanity and righteousness
will surely prove a failure. Without a firm foundation laid in agriculture yet
intended for high development, a [state's] economy will surely break down )
° 986
' P - 30) <Tran^tion: Those in possession of state power
will be able to hold the power firmly if they observe [the principle of] humanity
Those who assist the ruler in governing the sate will never fall from [high] status so
long as they remain righteous.), and %UiM„lWi#.J$<**.*i*t. 1ft* * " (1986,
p. 34) (Translation: Humanity is the key to the Dao. Righteousness is what the sage
learns [to practice]. Those who learn [to practice] humanity and righteousness will
be wise. Those who deviate from these two [paths of life] will be fatuous. Those
who run counter to them are doomed.) vs. The Grand Duke's Art of War (Liutao
1958, p. 44a): tjc *.*.t-#,
iiM%Ki:iM%Vtti\i/mt%4UbK (Translation: The [whole] terrain under the sun is
thus not something to be owned by any autocrat. It belongs to no one except the
holder of the Dao. Only a holder of the Dao can administer it, set rules for it,
make use of it, always be at peace in it. Therefore, the [authority to govern] the
terrain is hard to gain but easy to lose.)
(8) . English translation by Chan (1963). Romanization converted to Pinyin.
(9) . Xunzi: "^4,^,4^" vs. Wang Bi: tt^4ib4t^xb^ n
(10). See Note (5).
(1 1) . To my knowledge so far, the evidence of such respect can be found only in the
inscriptions of three imperial jade seals of the Qin dynasty: % ", "#Jl<i$
te&bV\ and (Yan Kejun, 1958, p. 121b) (All roughly meaning:
Long live our Emperor, whose authority [to govern the terrain under the sun] is
mandated by the Heaven!)
(12) . There was such practice even in the Qin dynasty. During the reign of the
Second Emperor of the Qin dynasty, once there was such message reaching the
throne that a peasants' uprising had taken place. At the emperor's request to give
opinions, some scholars said: "Rebellious ideas should not even cross a subject's
mind. To have such idea crossing one's mind is as guilty as to actually engage in a
revolt. The crime is beyond amnesty and deserves death penalty." (Ban Gu, 1970,
p. 2124) In making such a juridical opinion, these scholars were quoting Gongyang
Zhuan yA^^ (vol. 9, vol. 22), which says: For the relative of a lord, rebellious
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tiZ awav Z?r ? h 'S m 'nd - If SUCh 11,1,18 hW™' he shouW be executed
DracticHn th^ h r
Seem W°rth n0ting here l>-^ lacks evidenee of suchp actice in the historical records about the reign of the first emperor of the dynastyL'T ngT„after 'h0Se scholars had Sive" the above opinion, the emperor had
aTJS J"? °"
Charges of improperly". One thus has reason to posit
that such practice did not prevail until the Han dynasty.
(13). "«M«J»^m*M*C (Su Zhe, 1968, p. 1367b) (Translation: To
have rebellious idea cross one's mind is as seriously condemned in Gongyang Zhuan
as the guilt of murdenng three innocent members of a family is unlikely to be
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